Théorie Argumentative Du Raisonnementfleeting
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Finally, in many cases, no single participant had the correct answer to begin with. Several participants may be partly wrong and partly right, but the group will collectively be able to retain only the correct parts and thus converge on the right answer. This leads to the assembly bonus effect, in which the performance of the group is better than that of its best member
the ubiquitous finding across many decades of research (e.g., see Hill 1982; Steiner 1972) is that groups usually fall short of reasonable potential productivity baselines” (Kerr & Tindale 2004, p. 625). Moreover, other types of motivation have no such beneficial effect on reasoning. By and large, monetary incentives, even substantial ones, fail to improve performance in reasoning and decision-making tasks
he confirmation bias consists in the “seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand”
Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade.
Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context.
Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions.
Inference (as the term is most commonly understood in psychology) is the production of new mental representations on the basis of previously held representations.
People may be aware of having reached a certain conclusion – be aware, that is, of the output of an inferential process – but we claim that they are never aware of the process itself.
we are suggesting that arguments are not the output of a system 2 mechanism for explicit reasoning, that would be standing apart from, and in symmetrical contrast to, a system 1 mechanism for intuitive inference.
Rather, arguments are the output of one mechanism of intuitive inference among many that delivers intuitions about premise-conclusion relationships.
It is sometimes claimed (e.g., by Kahneman 2003) that the meliorative function of system 2 reasoning is achieved by correcting mistakes in system 1 intuitions. However, reasoning itself is a potential source of new mistakes.
Moreover, there is considerable evidence that when reasoning is applied to the conclusions of intuitive inference, it tends to rationalize them rather than to correct them
learning can be defined as “the process by which we become able to use past and current events to predict what the future holds”
The issue is not whether, on occasion, reasoning can help correct intuitive mistakes or better adapt us to novel circumstances. No doubt, it can. The issue is how far these occasional benefits explain the costs incurred, and hence the very existence of reasoning among humans, and also explain its characteristic features.
The task of epistemic vigilance is to evaluate communicator and the content of their messages in order to filter communicated information.
People routinely calibrate the trust they grant different speakers on the basis of their competence and benevolence
When it uncovers some incoherence, an epistemically vigilant addressee must choose between two alternatives. The simplest is to reject communicated information, thus avoiding any risk of being |1.27| misled. This may, however, deprive the addressee of valuable information and of the opportunity to correct or update earlier beliefs. The second, more elaborate, alternative consists in associating coherence checking and trust calibration and allowing for a finer-grained process of belief revision.
if a highly trusted individual tells us something that is incoherent with our previous beliefs, some revision is unavoidable: We must revise either our confidence of the source or our previous beliefs.
likely to choose the revision that reestablishes coherence at the lesser cost, and this will often consist in accepting the information communicated and revising our beliefs.
try to convince her addressee by offering premises the addressee already believes or is willing to accept on trust, and showing that, once these premises are accepted, it would be less coherent to reject the conclusion than to accept
Communication plays an obvious role in human cooperation both in the setting of common goals and in the allocation of duties and rights.
When we want to convince an interlocutor with a different viewpoint, we should be looking for arguments in favor of our viewpoint rather than in favor of hers. Therefore, the next prediction is that reasoning used to produce argument should exhibit a strong confirmation bias
possibility that, even in decision making, the main function of reasoning is to produce arguments to convince others rather than to find the best decision.
Thus, we predict that reasoning will drive people towards decisions for which they can argue – decisions that they can justify – even if these decisions are not optimal
as soon as these logical problems can be made sense of in an argumentative context, performance improves. For instance, participants can easily understand a modus tollens argument when it is of use not simply to pass some test but to evaluate communicated information (see Thompson et al. 2005b); the production of valid modus tollens arguments in argumentative contexts is also “surprisingly common”
participants are able to recognize the macrostructure of arguments (Ricco 2003), to follow the commitments of different speakers (Rips 1998), and to attribute the burden of proof appropriately
dans un paquet de situations, le raisonnement n’est pas utilisé pour rechercher la vérité mais plutôt pour justifier ses propres opinions !
Pourquoi passerions-nous tant de temps et utiliserions-nous tant d’énergie pour effectuer une activité qui ne donne même pas des résultats fiables en terme de recherche de la vérité ?
le raisonnement ne servirait pas à améliorer le savoir et prendre de meilleures décisions, mais à convaincre vos interlocuteurs dans un débat, et débusquer les interlocuteurs qui chercheraient à vous tromper ! Le raisonnement aurait donc une fonction première “argumentative”, d’où le nom de cette théorie “argumentative” du raisonnement.
raisonnement ne sert pas qu’à produire des arguments susceptibles de convaincre vos interlocuteurs, il est aussi bon dans l’autre sens, c’est à dire pour évaluer les arguments de vos interlocuteurs et trouver des failles dans leurs raisonnements
Comment savoir si ce que vous dit un interlocuteur est vrai ? Le raisonnement, tout “simplement
plus de nous permettre de produire des arguments convaincants, le raisonnement nous permet d’évaluer les arguments des autres pour savoir si l’on devrait accepter leurs conclusions ou non.
tendance à chercher des arguments qui tendent à justifier leurs opinions et ne cherchent pas à être impartial
biais de confirmation ne sont plus expliqués comme des “erreurs de raisonnement” mais bien au contraire comme des raisons d’être du raisonnement
théorie argumentative est “positive”, car elle arrête de voir les biais de raisonnement comme des dysfonctionnements
raisonnement humain n’est pas un mécanisme général profondément malfonctionnel ; c’est un appareil remarquablement spécialisé et efficace adapté à un certain type d’interactions sociales et cognitives dans lesquelles il excelle.
raisonner n’aide pas vraiment à prendre les bonnes décisions, contrairement à ce que les théories classiques prédisent
théories classiques prédisent que le raisonnement sert à peser le pour et le contre avant de prendre une décision, tandis que la théorie argumentative postule que les décisions sont majoritairement prises intuitivement, et que le raisonnement ne sert qu’à justifier pourquoi telle ou telle décision a été prise
elle permet d’expliquer TOUS ces résultats à la fois
théorie argumentative permet de répondre aux questions “Pourquoi ?”, “Pourquoi les humains possèdent un biais de confirmation ?”, “pourquoi font-ils du raisonnement motivé ?”, “pourquoi basent-ils leurs décisions sur la justification la plus facile ?”.
Dans la plupart des discussions, plutôt que de chercher les failles dans nos propres arguments, il est plus aisé de laisser la personne en face les trouver et d’ajuster ensuite, si besoin, nos arguments
just that the direction reasoning takes is mostly determined by the participants’ initial intuitions. If they have arrived at the conclusion themselves, or if they agree with it, they try to confirm it. If they disagree with it, they try to prove it wrong. In all cases, what they do is try to confirm their initial intuition.
Participants have intuitions that lead them towards certain answers. If reasoning is used at all, it is mostly used to confirm these initial intuitions. This is exactly what one should expect of an argumentative skill, and so these results bolster our claim that the main function of reasoning is argumentative.
if people were easily able to abstract from this bias, or if they were subject to it only in argumentative settings, then this would constitute evidence against the present theory.
reasoning tends not to be used olution of a disagreement through discussion. When one is alone or with people who hold similar views, one’s arguments will not be critically evaluated. This is when the confirmation bias is most likely to lead to poor outcomes.
teaching of critical thinking skills, which is supposed to help us overcome the bias on a purely individual basis, does not seem to yield very good results (Ritchart & Perkins 2005; Willingham
For the confirmation bias to play an optimal role in discussions and group performance, it should be active only in the production of arguments and not in their evaluation. Of course,
While we think of most of our beliefs – to the extent that we think about them at all – not as beliefs but just as pieces of knowledge, we are also aware that some of them are unlikely to be universally shared, or to be accepted on trust just because we express them.
what they do is mostly produce arguments to support or rebut the argument they are evaluating, depending on whether they agree with its conclusion or not. Participants are not trying to form an opinion: They already have one. Their goal is argumentative rather than epistemic, and it ends up being pursued at the expense of epistemic soundness. That
motivated reasoning leads to a biased assessment: Arguments with unfavored conclusions are rated as less sound and less persuasive than arguments with favored conclusions.
counterattitudinal conclusion (one that goes against their own beliefs or preferences),
in the domain of politics, attitude polarization is most easily observed in participants who are most knowledgeable (see also Braman 2009; Redlawsk 2002). Their knowledge makes it possible for these participants to find more counterarguments, leading to more biased evaluations.
reasoning can play in maintaining moral hypocrisy (when we judge someone else’s action by |1.88| using tougher moral criteria than we use to judge our own actions).
Reasoning is often used to find justifications for performing actions that are otherwise felt to be unfair or immoral
Perpetrators of crimes will be tempted to “blame the victim” or find other excuses to mitigate the effects of violating their moral intuitions
Instead, by looking only for supporting arguments, reasoning strengthens people’s opinions, distorts their estimates, and allows them to get away with violations of their own moral intuitions. In these cases, epistemic or moral goals are not well served by reasoning. By contrast, argumentative goals are: People are better able to support their positions or to justify their moral judgments. |1.89| 5. Proactive reasoning in decision making
People may also have to put forward arguments to defend their decisions and actions, and they may reason proactively to that end. We want to argue that this is the main role of reasoning in decision making. This claim stands in sharp contrast to the classical view that reasoning about possible options and weighing up their pros and cons is the most reliable way – if not the only reliable way – to arrive
attitudes based on reasons were much less predictive of future behaviors (and often not predictive at all) than were attitudes stated without recourse to reasons.
the same irrelevant attribute will sometimes be used as a reason for choosing an item (Carpenter et al. 1994) and sometimes as a reason for rejecting it (Simonson et al. 1993; 1994), depending on what decision it makes easier to justify
Reasoning, we have argued, enables communicators to produce arguments to convince addressees who would not accept what they say on trust; it enables addressees to evaluate the soundness of these arguments and to accept valuable information that they would be suspicious of otherwise.
Some of the evidence reviewed here shows not only that reasoning falls short of delivering rational beliefs and rational decisions reliably, but also that, in a variety of cases, it may even be detrimental to rationality. Reasoning can lead to poor outcomes not because humans are bad at it but because they systematically look for arguments to justify their beliefs or their actions.
People who have an opinion to defend don’t really evaluate the arguments of their interlocutors in a search for genuine information but rather consider them from the start as counterarguments to be rebutted.
In these group tasks, individual participants come up with and propose to the group the same inappropriate answers that they come up with in individual testing.
most discussions, rather than looking for flaws in our own arguments, it is easier to let the other person find them and only then adjust our arguments, if necessary.
In general, one should be cautious about using the striking accomplishments of reasoning as proof of its overall efficiency, since its failures are often much less visible
When one happens to be on the right track and “more right” than one could initially have guessed, some of the distorting effects of motivated reasoning and polarization may turn into blessings. For instance, motivated reasoning may have pushed Darwin to focus obsessively on the idea of natural selection and explore all possible supporting arguments and consequences. But, for one Darwin, how many Paleys?
In a dialogic context, one starts from the conclusion and tries to find premises that will convince one’s interlocutor. It is this meaning of production that is relevant here.
Humans are cultural animals, which means they use cultural systems as their strategy for improving survival and reproduction (e.g.,
say that reasoning is for arguing does not mean reasoning is irrelevant to seeking the truth, but people seek the truth collectively, not individually.
distinctively human traits, such as the capacity for reason, are mainly for creating culture, sustaining it, and participating in it.
For more than a century, psychology has regarded William James’s famous conclusion that thinking is for doing as an unassailable truism. Yet our own research has led us to entertain a rival hypothesis, that much of thinking is for talking
Few, however, seem to have heeded the implication that the purpose of conscious thought is precisely for enabling people to tell their thoughts to one another.
whether conscious thoughts have any causal influence on behavior. A recent survey suggests a positive answer (Baumeister
Conscious thought enables people to talk to others and thereby enables small groups to resolve differences.
By talking, people can resolve conflicts, influence one another, converge on the truth (aided vitally by reasoning when there are differences), and thereby function together more harmoniously and effectively than nonhuman groups.
Nonhuman animals, in contrast, have a have a relatively simple and unsophisticated language apparatus compared with humans. They resolve conflicts through aggression instead of reconciliation, dominate others instead of attempting to persuade one another, and rely on what appears true in the present environment instead of using logical reasoning to understand that things are not always as they initially seem.
Conscious thought enables both reasoning and advanced forms of communication, including arguing.
all these reason-based choice effects, the justifying arguments do not withstand close scrutiny. They are simply “shallow but nice-sounding rationales”
although people very often fail to select the correct logical response, they at least seek to adhere to the logical norm.
What the “freakish” individuals who give the correct response seem to be better at is completing the inhibition of conflicting intuitive heuristic responses
deliberative reasoning is a byproduct of argumentative competence
it suggests that individual reasoning is an internalized version of overt argumentation, conducted in inner speech and guided by knowledge acquired in the course of public argumentation.
(There are other reasons, too, for thinking that conscious reasoning is languageinvolving; see, e.g., Carruthers 1996 and 1998.)
even as private reasoners, we have other motives besides epistemic ones. We often accept propositions for pragmatic reasons, because we find them comforting, or because they are popular with our peers. Moreover,
we value psychological stability for its own sake; we like to have a settled set of opinions (to know our own minds) (Frankish 2004). We may therefore be inclined to bolster our opinions with arguments, so that our future selves will be able to resist counterevidence and avoid distressing changes of mind.
in many cases it is better to form and stick with an intention, even if it is not optimal, than to remain undecided or keep changing one’s plans. Given this, people may tend to settle on decisions they find easy to justify to themselves, and to buttress them with arguments, so that they will not be tempted to revise them later. Hence,
claim that the main function of reasoning is to generate support for conclusions
if M&S’s dual-process model of reasoning is accurate, professional reasoners initially arrive at their conclusions by intuitive leaps and only later construct logical arguments to convince others of these conclusions.
How can truth win out amongst sophistical S2s committed not to discovering the facts but to defending S1’s representation of them?
vast majority of psychological studies and conclusions are based on Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) participants who represent less than 12% of the world population (college students, a subset of that). The
Rather than a review of human capabilities, we have a glimpse into a narrow slice of reasoning by immature reasoners from an abnormal culture.
We agree with Poletiek that most of hypothesis testing is actually not directed by reasoning, and that confirmatory strategies are the result of heuristics that do not display a genuine confirmation bias. But this does not explain why people fail to adopt falsificatory strategies when they are asked to and adopt them spontaneously when they test someone else’s hypothesis. It seems as though reasoning is unable to correct our own intuitions even though it can easily try to correct those of others. Wolfe
The belief bias is one of the phenomena that, we surmised, show that people have a confirmation bias: They will take into account their beliefs about the conclusion when evaluating the logical validity of a syllogism
We agree that in reasoning tasks people try to provide the correct, logically valid answer. What is more interesting is that most of them fail. Given that the tasks are not computationally hard, this indicates that reasoning is not geared towards pure logical validity, but that it takes count other factors, such as believability.
Even if scientists rely more on empirdo philosophers to correct their intuitions, their reasoning is still deeply argumentative.
Notes linking here
- avoir l’intuition de faire les choses bien vs être convaincu de faire les choses bien
- bullshit meetings
- comment expliquer être d’accord sur les conclusions sans être nécessairement d’accord avec les prémisses et arguments ?
- convaincre = impossible?
- explanation is often an illusion
- honnêteté intellectuelle, nuance/modestie épistémique, hygiène mentale
- identifying cognitive biases helps feeling better
- intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second
- Jason Brennan: against democracy
- mes valeurs
- nous sommes de mauvais estimateurs tous seuls, mais de bon estimateurs en groupe
- on ment volontiers pour avoir raison
- people need explanations
- réparer les émotions
- théorie argumentative du raisonnement, rasoir de Hanlon et se sentir bien
- why is it so hard to do the right thing?