- Référence externe : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method
an election method that elects the candidate who wins a majority of the vote in every head-to-head election against each of the other candidates, that is, a candidate preferred by more voters than any others, whenever there is such a candidate
pairwise champion or beats-all winner, is formally called the Condorcet winner
Some elections may not yield a Condorcet winner because voter preferences may be cyclic—that is, it is possible (but rare) that every candidate has an opponent that defeats them in a two-candidate contest
such cyclic preferences is known as the Condorcet paradox.
However, a smallest group of candidates that beat all candidates not in the group, known as the Smith set, always exists. The Smith set is guaranteed to have the Condorcet winner in it should one exist. Many Condorcet methods elect a candidate who is in the Smith set absent a Condorcet winner, and is thus said to be “Smith-efficient”.
If there is no Condorcet winner different Condorcet-compliant methods may elect different winners in the case of a cycle—Condorcet methods differ on which other criteria they satisfy.
Each voter ranks the candidates in order of preference (top-to-bottom, or best-to-worst, or 1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc.). The voter may be allowed to rank candidates as equals and to express indifference (no preference) between them. Candidates omitted by a voter may be treated as if the voter ranked them at the bottom. For each pairing of candidates (as in a round-robin tournament) count how many votes rank each candidate over the other candidate. Thus each pairing will have two totals: the size of its majority and the size of its minority (or there will be a tie).
Notes pointant ici
- choosing a gift using condorcet methods
- pourquoi notre système de vote est nul (et le moyen le plus simple de l’améliorer)
- principe de Condorcet